MAPping the Future

(2nd of 2 parts)

 

The first part of this piece noted what House Bill 8389 prohibits: simultaneous holding of elective office by close relatives at the same level of government. This part examines how the bill proposes to enforce that prohibition — and why the mechanism raises questions that go beyond mere implementation.

 

Section 7 of the bill addresses the scenario where two relatives have both filed certificates of candidacy, creating what it calls a “potential political dynasty relationship.” COMELEC notifies them within five days. They then have 48 hours to submit a joint written agreement identifying which of them will assume office if both win. If they cannot agree in 48 hours, COMELEC draws lots.

 

The provision deserves careful study. Philippine voters do not elect families. They elect individuals. The right of suffrage under Article V is the right to choose a specific person for a specific office. A mechanism that randomly removes a duly nominated candidate from contention — before a single vote is cast — substitutes chance for the sovereign choice of the electorate. It invites a serious constitutional challenge that COMELEC and the courts will eventually have to resolve.

 

A more defensible approach would apply disqualification after the election: the relative who receives fewer votes steps down. This preserves voter expression while enforcing the prohibition. It is also more consistent with how COMELEC handles other disqualification scenarios. The lot-drawing provision reflects an unresolved policy choice rather than a considered constitutional design.

 

A stronger Anti-Dynasty Law must be measured against established legal and international standards. Philippine jurisprudence already supports this direction. In Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 177597 and 178628, the Court affirmed the state’s compelling interest in limiting political monopolies. A more robust statute could build on that principle by prohibiting not only simultaneous office-holding, but also successive office-holding — a familiar tactic for evading term limits. Brazil and Costa Rica, for example, use candidacy-ineligibility rules that bar immediate relatives from succeeding incumbents, treating public office as a finite public trust rather than an inheritable family estate. Indonesia’s legal efforts have likewise increasingly targeted vertical succession to prevent party capture, offering a model that moves beyond a narrow focus on simultaneity.

 

Section 6 compounds the concern. Every candidate must file a sworn statement declaring no prohibited dynastic relationship. But the bill specifies no penalty for a false declaration beyond whatever general perjury law might provide. A candidate who conceals a family connection, wins, and is later exposed faces no dynasty-specific sanction. COMELEC is given no investigative authority, no verification timeline, and no enforcement tool specific to this Act — unless the implementing rules supply what the text omits. The sworn statement becomes a formality rather than a safeguard.

 

It is important to distinguish between a law crafted to function effectively and one intended merely to exist on paper. While HB 8389 contains substantive provisions, broad coverage, and a clear constitutional foundation in Article II, Section 26, it lacks a genuine enforcement framework. Without concrete mechanisms for implementation and accountability, the bill risks becoming a symbolic gesture rather than a meaningful tool for reform.

 

For these reasons, HB 8389 should not advance in its present form. Its limited prohibitions create the appearance of compliance while leaving untouched the practices that allow dynastic control to endure. The Senate should withhold approval; if the bill reaches Malacañang, the President should return it with a veto.

 

The more credible path is citizen-led reform. When Congress has strong incentives to preserve family-based power, the People’s Initiative offers voters a constitutional route to define, for themselves, the boundaries of public office. That is why the “Dapat Isa Lang” campaign of the People’s Initiative Coalition Against Dynasties deserves broad public support.

 

Its core reforms respond directly to the loopholes HB 8389 leaves open:

• one family member, up to the fourth civil degree, may hold a national position, and one may hold a local position, at any given time; and
• succession and office-switching are barred as means of keeping power within the same family.

 

When Congress is unable or unwilling to legislate against entrenched family interests, direct legislation by the people becomes not only appropriate but necessary.

 

On its face, HB 8389 is constitutionally permissible. It rests on a valid enabling provision and does not, by itself, violate equal protection or suffrage rights. But permissibility is not the same as fidelity. The framers of the 1987 Constitution did not write Article II, Section 26 to allow one family one seat per level, per jurisdiction, at the same time. They wrote it to dismantle rotational dynasties, cross-level dynasties, and dynasties that simply wait their turn.

 

A law that leaves those practices intact may satisfy the letter of the constitutional mandate, but it betrays its spirit.

 

[The author is a member of the Governance Committee of Management Association of the Philippines (MAP). He is a lawyer, industrial engineer, and the President of Justice Reform Initiative (JRI). He is former Chair of Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD) and National Renewable Energy Board, a senior policy adviser to the Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities, and Chair Emeritus of Energy Lawyers Association of the Philippines (ELAP). Feedback at <map@map.org.ph> and <phmaniego@gmail.com>.)