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Leadership under Pressure: Marcos and the Test of Institutional Trust

by Gen. JAIME S. DE LOS SANTOS - November 17, 2026

A year ago, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stood before the nation and did something Philippine presidents rarely do: he openly acknowledged a scandal as a problem his Administration had to confront and fix. He did not simply dismiss it as another government’s mess or leave the matter to investigators. He made it a responsibility of his Administration.

What has happened since that SONA is worth looking at—not simply from a political perspective, but as a lesson in leadership under pressure. The response to the flood control scandal has gradually moved beyond speeches and promises and into investigations, prosecutions, institutional changes, and budget decisions. Whether these efforts will ultimately succeed remains to be seen, but they have already raised an important question: can a government rebuild public trust after its own institutions have been badly compromised?

The numbers alone show how serious the problem is.

Cases have been filed against at least 30 individuals, most of them public works officials. Independent tallies put the number even higher, at around 45 when cases filed in regional courts are included, while dozens more remain under investigation by the Ombudsman. Authorities have also recovered, frozen, or preserved nearly ₱25Billion (B) in assets connected to the flood control scandal, with more than ₱800Million already returned to the National Treasury.

Those numbers are significant, but they also tell an uncomfortable story. The amount recovered is still small compared with the estimated scale of the alleged losses. One Senator estimated that roughly ₱1.14Trillion (T) may have been diverted from a 15-year, ₱1.9T infrastructure program.

In other words, what has been recovered so far may only be the beginning.

That gap should not be forgotten. Recovering billions may look impressive, but it should also remind us how much public money may have been lost—and how many roads, bridges, drainage systems, schools, hospitals, and flood-control projects could have been built with it.

From Punishment to Prevention

What I find more significant than the number of arrests or cases filed is the effort to create mechanisms that could outlast the scandal itself.

The President created the Independent Commission for Infrastructure (ICI) through an Executive Order and tasked it with examining a decade of public works spending. Its mandate went beyond the flood control controversy, giving it the opportunity to look at broader problems in infrastructure spending and procurement.

The ICI has since completed its work and turned over its evidence, testimonies, and findings to the Department of Justice and the Ombudsman for further action.

That distinction matters.

There is a difference between punishing people after a scandal and changing the system that allowed the scandal to happen in the first place. If the government only prosecutes a few individuals but leaves the same weaknesses in procurement, project monitoring, auditing, and accountability, another scandal could simply emerge somewhere else.

The real measure of success, therefore, should not only be how many people are prosecuted. It should be whether the government can make it harder for the next group of corrupt officials and contractors to do the same thing.

Changing the Culture Inside Government

The changes at the Department of Public Works and Highways also deserve attention.

When new leadership came in, senior officials were asked to submit courtesy resignations. The incoming Secretary then personally inspected flood control projects across the country and identified hundreds of projects that were reportedly ghost projects or substandard.

That kind of action sends a simple message: government officials are not supposed to manage public projects from behind a desk alone. They must be willing to see what is actually happening on the ground.

A public reporting portal has also been established, allowing ordinary citizens to report suspicious projects. This is important because government cannot monitor every road, river, bridge, and flood-control structure by itself. The people who live beside these projects are often the first to know when something is wrong.

The decision to remove locally funded flood control allocations from the 2026 budget while the cleanup was underway was another significant step. Instead of simply continuing the same spending and promising to investigate later, the government chose to pause and reassess.

Taken together, these measures suggest an attempt to address the problem at more than one level—from personnel and projects to procurement and public participation.

That is a much more difficult task than simply announcing that someone has been arrested.

But Accountability Must Be Consistent

Still, it would be premature to declare victory.

One area that continues to raise questions is the government’s use of confidential and intelligence funds. These funds have long been controversial because their nature makes them more difficult for the public to scrutinize.

The Office of the President received ₱4.5B under this category in the 2026 budget—more than a third of the government’s total confidential and intelligence fund pool. Government-wide, these funds reached nearly ₱12B.

This creates a difficult contradiction.

A government cannot convincingly tell the public that transparency and accountability are essential while maintaining large portions of the budget that remain difficult for citizens to examine. National security considerations can justify some level of confidentiality, but confidentiality should never become a blanket excuse for weak accountability.

To the Administration’s credit, the proposed 2027 national budget reduces confidential and intelligence funds to ₱10.77B, an 8.8% decrease from the current year. The Office of the President’s proposed allocation also remains roughly around ₱4.58B.

That is movement in the right direction, but it is not enough to settle the larger question.

The better goal should be structural reform: clearer rules, stronger auditing mechanisms, and meaningful safeguards that ensure confidential funds are used only for legitimate purposes.

Reducing the amount is one thing. Making the system more accountable is another.

A Leadership Lesson Beyond Politics

This is where the flood control controversy becomes more than a political story. It becomes a test of leadership and, more importantly, a test of whether government can turn a crisis into meaningful reform.

Imagine discovering widespread fraud inside a large organization. The leader would face the same difficult choices: act quickly and risk appearing disruptive, or move slowly and risk appearing complicit. There is no perfect response. But there are principles that should guide any responsible leader: bring in independent investigators, protect evidence, hold those responsible accountable, replace compromised leadership when necessary, stop questionable spending, give people a safe way to report wrongdoing, and, most importantly, fix the weaknesses that allowed the problem to happen in the first place.

That is essentially the challenge facing the government today. The flood control scandal cannot end with arrests, investigations, or the recovery of stolen money. Those actions are necessary, but they only address the damage that has already been done. The harder task is making sure the same weaknesses in procurement, project monitoring, auditing, and accountability do not allow another scandal to take its place.

And the cost of failure is far greater than the money lost on paper.

Flood control projects are meant to protect real people and real communities. When funds intended for these projects are stolen or wasted, the consequences are felt in flooded homes, lost livelihoods, damaged businesses, impassable roads, and communities left vulnerable when heavy rains come. In the end, taxpayers pay twice: first for a project that was supposed to be built, and again when government has to spend more money dealing with the damage that the project should have prevented.

This is why corruption cannot be treated simply as a matter of morality or criminality. It is also an economic and public safety issue. Every peso lost to corruption is a peso that cannot be used to protect a community, educate a child, improve healthcare, or build infrastructure that people actually need. The reported estimate that as much as 60% of some allocated funds may have been lost before projects were properly completed shows just how deeply corruption can undermine public investment.

The decision to redirect ₱225B in flood-control allocations toward education and health may have been controversial, but it also illustrates a basic truth about public spending: government has limited resources, and every peso wasted in one area means less money available for another. Good governance is therefore not simply about catching people who steal. It is about making sure public money reaches the people it was meant to serve.

That is where the real leadership test begins. The Administration has an opportunity to show that the flood control scandal will not be remembered only as another corruption case, but as a turning point in how public projects are planned, funded, monitored, and delivered. Whether that happens will depend not on the number of headlines generated today, but on whether the reforms remain in place long after the headlines disappear.

Leadership under pressure is not measured only by how a government responds when everyone is watching. It is measured by what remains after the crisis has passed. If stronger institutions emerge, if public money is better protected, and if Filipinos can once again have greater confidence that government resources are being used for their benefit, then this painful episode may yet produce something valuable: not just accountability for what went wrong, but a stronger system that makes it harder for the same wrongs to happen again.

The Real Test Comes Later

For me, however, the most important question is not what the government has done while the scandal is still making headlines.

The real test will come when people stop talking about it.

Scandals create pressure. Leaders respond. Investigations are launched. Officials are replaced. Committees are formed. Budgets are reviewed.

But public attention eventually moves on.

The challenge is making sure that the reforms remain even after the cameras leave.

Will the changes in public works procurement remain in place? Will project monitoring become more rigorous? Will citizens continue to have meaningful ways to report suspicious projects? Will the cases filed against those responsible actually result in accountability? Will confidential funds become more transparent and properly regulated?

These are the questions that will determine whether this was genuine institutional reform or simply a temporary response to political pressure.

Leadership is not measured only by how a government responds when everyone is watching. It is measured by what remains after the crisis has passed.

President Marcos Jr. has been given an opportunity to demonstrate that lesson.

The flood control scandal has exposed serious weaknesses in the country’s system of public spending and accountability. But it has also created an opportunity to correct them.

The Administration should therefore be judged neither by its promises nor by the number of headlines generated by arrests and investigations. It should be judged by whether the institutions become stronger, whether public money is better protected, and whether Filipinos can once again believe that government resources are being used for their benefit.

That is the real test of leadership under pressure.

And that is ultimately the test of institutional trust.

(This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not reflect the official stand of the Management Association of the Philippines or MAP. The author is a member of the MAP.  He is Chair and CEO of Veterans of WWII, Veterans Affairs Administration. Feedback at <map@map.org.ph> and <jimmydlsantos@gmail.com>).